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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STAliE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. HOLDER,
Respondent, and Plaintiff,
vs. ----

Case No.
8984

RUTH M. l10LDER,
Appellant and Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE11ENT OF THE CASE
The parties will be referred to as in the trial court.
Plaintiff brought an action for annuhnent of a marriage that took place between the parties on February 2,
1957, on the ground that the marriage was induced solely
by defendant's representations that she was carrying
plaintiff's child; that said representations were fraudulent and relied upon by the plaintiff and plaintiff would
not have entered the marriage contract had it not been
for the fraudlent representations (R.l).
The defendant answered, denying the fraudlent representations and counterclaimed for divorce, alimony,
and child support (R. 4-6). The plaintiff replied to the
counterclaim (R. 7-8). The pretrial order set forth that
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the pleadings determined the issues (R. 18). The matter
was tried before Judge Stewart M. Hanson on May 29,
1958 (R. 19).
Judge Hanson filed a memorandum decision on June
6, 1958 (R. 106-107). Findings and Conclusions (R. 109111) and a Decree (R. 112), finding for. the plaintiff and
against the defendant on the complaint and dismissing
defendant's counterclaim as no cause of action, were filed
on the 24th day of June, 1958. Defendant moved to alter
the judgment and for a new trial (R. 115-116) on July 6,
1958, and filed a notice on appeal on July 23, 1958. The
court denied the defendant's motions to alter the judgment and to grant a new trial (R. 119), and amended its
Findings of Fact changing the date "December 25th"
in Findings paragraphs 2, 10, 11 and 12 to read "December 24th" (R. 121). On December 2, 1958, defendant filed
a second notice of appeal from the original judgment and
for denial of the motions for new trial (R. 122).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff cannot agree with the defendant's Staternent of Facts, many appearing to be taken as conclusions
and conflicting 1naterially frmn the facts found by the
f'Ourt. Therefore, we must restate the facts.
Several of the facts are uncontroverted, those being
( 1) The parties were 1narried on February 2, 1957, in
Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 22). (2) The parties had had
no contact or access to each other between the first part
of May, 1956, and Dece1nber 2-1-, 1956, the plaintiff having
been jn Alaska (R. 22 and R. -!G--!7). (3) A female child
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was born to the defendant on August 13, 1957. ( 4) The
child was born 192 days after the marriage (computation)
and 232 day after the first possible applicable act of intercourse between the parties. ( 5) The defendant went
to Dr. Von Holbrook on l\1arch 29, 1957 (R. 22). (6) The
defendant had a rabbit test on January 7th, two weeks
following her first intercourse with the plaintiff.
Other than these facts, the statements of the parties
and supporting witnesses vary widely. The defendant,
an eighteen-year-old woman, testified substantially as
follows: That she had known the plaintiff and had gone
around with him regularly for smne time prior to May
1956 when he went to Alaska (R. 30); that she was in
love with the plaintiff and wanted to marry him (R. 30);
that she did not see or have personal contact with the
plaintiff between the first part of 11ay 1956, and December 24, 1956; in December of 1956 she went to 11onterey,
California, with the plaintiff's parents for the purpose
of meeting Richard I-Iolder who was returning from
Alaska; the parties saw each other for the first time in
eight months on Christmas eve and had an act of intercourse on the beach that evening about 10:00 o'clock.
Defendant had been to see Dr. Juel 'Trowbridge of Bountiful relative to nausea and stmnach upset prior to going
to California. Defendant testified she had her last menstrual cycle (beginning of the flow period) on the 25th of
November, 1956, or twenty-nine days prior to her act of
intercourse with Richard Holder. She had her previous
menstrual cycle on November 6th, nineteen days before
the last she claims (R. 26). On the 25th day of December,
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or the morning after the initial act of intercourse with the
plaintiff, she discussed being pregnant with him (R. 27).
On the 29th day of December, or five days after the act
of intercourse, she told Mrs. Holder she thought she was
pregnant. She testified that she expected the menstrual
period on the way home from California (R. 29) and
that would be some thirty-five days after the last menstrual period that she claimed.
She had a rabbit test on January 7th, taken by Dr.
Trowbridge because because she felt nauseated on the
way back frmn California. However, she also testified
that she had nausea on the \Yay to California prior to
Ineeting the plaintiff (R. 34). Her menstrual periods
last from two to ten days (R. 31). During the month of
January, she talked to plaintiff relative to marriage,
saying she was carrying his baby. He told her he did not
want to get married (R. 32-33).
The plaintiff, Richard Holder, at the time of the
trial was twenty-two years old, had been in ~Uaska since
~fay of 1956, had not seen the defendant until the 24th
of December, 1956. He had intercourse with her on that
evening and several other tin1es on the trip. The next
da~v after the first intercourse. or Dece1nber ~5th she
told him she thought she was pregnant (H. -17). The first
part of January she told hi1n she was .. pretty sure" she
was prPgnant and ·was going to take a rabbit test (R. 48).
I Ie told her fr01n the beginning that he did not think the
child was his and that he did not want to 1narry her (R.
49). He 1narried her only due to her representations that
RlH' was earr)ring his child. Defendant left for Alaska on
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May 4, 1957, and has had no relationship with the defendant since that time. Defendant never told the plaintiff
that Dr. Holbrook estimated that the baby would arrive
in the middle of August.
The plaintiff's father testified that he picked the
defendant up at her home in Bountiful to start the trip
to Monterey, and at the time he picked her up she told
him that she had told her mother she was going to be
pregnant when she came back from California. Defendant
denied this conversation (R. 39). The plaintiff's mother
testified that the defendant first informed her that she
was pregnant early in January and that Ruth s1aw her
close to a dozen times at the store and at the house,
complaining that Dick did not want to marry her and asking her to prevail upon Dick to marry her (R. 71-72).
She further testified that after the baby was born, she
had a conversation vvith the defendant wherein she told
the witness that she had her }ast menstrual period the
first part of November (R. 74). She ralso stated that the
defendant told her that she had been to see Dr. Trowbridge concerning flu and nausea prior to the trip to
California, and that the doctor thought she was pregnant.
She did not mention the doctor by name but the earlier
conversation related to Dr. Trowbridge (R. 75). After
the witness' husband had informed her that the defendant
had told him she had told her mother she was coming
back from California pregnant, ~Irs. IIolder told the
defendant "you should not figure on taking the trip with
us and coming back in that condition. It wouldn't look
very nice on us" (R. 76).
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Dr. Von Holbrook testified that he was a surgeon
specializing in obstetrics and gynecology and has been
for sixteen years (R. 52), and that defendant consulted
him in relation to a pregiliancy on the 29th of March at
his office, and that he found her to be pregnant (R. 52).
According to the menstrual history she gave him she
should have been three months pregnant, but from his
physical examination it appeared to him that she was
further along. He could hear the fetel heartbeat on the
first visit which normally comes about four months. It
is extremely rare at three and one-half months and only
occasional at three and three-quarters months (R. 53).
There are times during his sixteen years of practice when
he may have heard a fetel heartbeat at three and one-half
months but it usually turned out that the person was further along in her pregnancy than expected from her
menstrual history (R. 54). The size of the uterus was
compatible with a four-month preglllancy (R. 54). It is
not probable that conception in this case took place as
late as December 25th (R. 55). He testified it is possible
that conception took place as late as that date if you
1nean one chance in 10,000 (R. 57). The Doctor delivered
the defendant's child and testified it was not probable
that the child was as much ·as six weeks short of "term".
He also testified there was no way that a woman could
tell she was pregnant one day after intercourse or within
seven days after intercourse (R. 58), and that any nausea
or morning sickness within a week after intercourse
would be purely psychological; that it is possible that a
Freeman test or a rabbit test could show pregnancy on
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the 7th day of J·anuary when conception occurred on the
24th day of December, but not probable (R. 65).
Dr. Horne, testifying for the defendant, testified
that normally he could first detect the fetel heartbeat at
sixteen to twenty weeks. He said that in some women
it was easier to detect the fetel heartbeat than in others
due to their size and physical condition and that, generally speaking, babies weigh less than the defendant's
baby if born six weeks before time. He testified that the
formula for determining the probable date of birth for a
child is by taking the date of the starting of the woman's
last menstrual period, adding seven days, and then
going back three months. The defendant on direct examination in the defendant's case testified as to necessary
living expenses in the event a divorce was granted and
expressly denied making the statements as to becoming
pregnant and as to the date of the first of November
menstrual cycle testified to by the parents of the plaintiff.
STATE~1ENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE CHILD WAS A "FULL TERM" OR "NEAR TERM"
BABY AND OOULD NO'T HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED AS
LATE AS DECEMBER 24, 1956.
POINT II
COVERING POINTS II AND III OF APPELLANT'S
BRIEF. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT DEFENDANT HAD SPOKEN 'TO PLAINTIFF'S FATHER REGARDING BEING PREGNANT ON RETURN FROM CALIFORNIA, AND DISCUSSED
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WITH PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MISSING THE MENSTRUAL
PERIOD PRIOR TO GOING TO CALIFORNIA.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT DEFENDANT
MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER 24, 1956.
POINT IV
THE .COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

ARGU1fENT
POINT I
THE CHILD WAS A "FULL TERM" OR "NEAR TERM"
BABY AND ·COULD NO'T HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED AS
LATE AS DECEMBER 24, 1956.

The child in question was a "full" or "near te11.11~'
baby. There is little difference in the testin1ony of the
two doctors in the cJase when read as a whole. Dr. Holbrook, who delivered the baby, estimated as early as
l\1:arch 29, 1957, that the child would be born about the
1niddle of August. This calculation was 1nade from physical findings which did not concur ·with the 1nenstrual
history given him by the defendant. The child \Yas born
on the 13th day of August, 1957. The defendant never
informed the plaintiff of Dr. Holbrook's eS'ti1nated tin1e
of birth.
The defendant testified that she had had her next to
last 1nenstrual period prior to birth of the child on the
Gth of N ovmnber, 1956. Applying the fonnula of Dr.
Horne who was the defendant's mn1 witness, taking the
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date of the starting of the last menstrual cycle (assuming
for purposes of computation that the last menstrual
cycle began November 6, 1956), and adding seven days
and then counting back three months, we find that the
baby would have been expected on exactly the day it was
born. This, combined with Dr. Holbrook's physical findings at all stages of the pregnancy, his estimate of the
probable birth date, the defendant's own testimony as to
nausea prior to arriving in California, the improbability
of an affirmative or positive showing on a Freeman or
rabbit test with two weeks after conception, and the
conflicting tesrtimony as to the statements against interest made by the defendant (a) to plaintiff's father
concerning her determination to be pregnant when she
came back from Oalifornia, and (b) her statements to
plaintiff's mother that she had contacted Dr. Trowbridge
prior to the California trip with relation to flu and missing a menstrual cycle, :all fit together to indicate the child
was a "full" or "near term" child.
1

POINT II
COVERING POINTS II AND III OF APPELLANT'S
BRIEF. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT DEFENDANT HAD SPOKEN 'TO PLAINTIFF'S FATHER REGARDING BEING PREGNANT ON RETURN FROM CALIFORNIA, AND DISCUSSED
WITH PLAINTIFF'S MOTHER MISSING THE MENSTRUAL
PERIOD PRIOR TO GOING TO CALIFORNIA.

The defendant puts great weight on (a) the argument on statements to the plaintiff's parents regarding
her determination to become pregnant and her admission
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after the baby was born to the plaintiff's mother thrut she
had contacted Dr. Trowbridge were improbable and beyond human belief, and (b) that the defendant offered
to waive her doctor-patient privilege if plaintiff wanted
to call in Dr. Trowbridge.
With respect to (a) above, it is true there is a conflict in testimony, the plaintiff's father claiming defendant made the statement as to beng pregnant when she
returned from California when he picked her up in Bountiful at the start of the trip. 'This the defendant denies i
However, Mrs. Holder confirms the statement as to
pregnancy with regard to a conversation with the defendant at R. 76. The record is filled with evidence that
the defendant began to claiin she was pregnant on the
25th of December, less than twenty-four hours after the
initial act of intercourse, and continued to make the claim
until the time of marriage. The court, who had the opportunity to see the witnesses, evaluate the incredibility,
candor, and demeanor, found that defendant had made
sueh 1a statement. This cotu·t has continually held that
the opinion and findings of the trial judge 1nust be given
great weight due to his personal contact with the witness
and opportunity to obseiTe and judge frmn state1nent~
heard from the witness' Inouth rather than fr01n the
written reeord.
Under the sanw reasoning, Judge Hanson was in a
more ·advantnp;eous position to detennine the credibility
and veraeity of the witnesses than is this court from
the written record.
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With respect to (b) above, the defendant denies
that she had a conversation with Mrs. Holder concerning
her visit to Dr. Trowbridge prior to the trip to California.
However, in her testimony defendant admits contacting
Dr. Trowbridge prior to the trip, but claims it was merely
with respect to :advice as to tre,atment of the flu. It is interesting to note that had there not been conversation
with Mrs. Holder respecting a visit to Dr. Trowbridge,
she would have had no way of knowing or finding out
about the visit to which she testified.
In his brief, denfendant's counsel stresses an affidavit signed by one Juel E. Trowbridge, M.D. (R. 117).
Such affidavit was not presented for admission ~at the
trial and is hearsay without opportunity cross examine,
and has apparently been altered since being made with
the alterations being uninitialed.
We ~also point out that defendant's counsel in his
brief stresses his offer to have defendant waive any
doctor-patient privileges between defendant and Dr.
Trowbridge if the plaintiff wish to call Dr. Trowbridge
in the matter. It would seem that Dr. Trowbridge's testimony might well have been proper rebuttal had the defendant chosen to call the doctor as a witness, which
she did not.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE 'THAT DEFENDANT
MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER 24, 1956.

As discussed in Point I, the child Debbie Holder
was born on August 13, 1957, 192 days after the marriage
of the parties herein :and a maximum of 232 day after
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intercourse between the parties. We are aware of the
presumption as to legitimacy of a child born in wedlock,
but feel that said presumption does not apply here. See
Gonzales vs. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 202 P ( 2d) 135.
As discussed in that case, it cites Estate of J\1cN amara,
183 Pac. 552, 7 A.L.R. 313 :
"The conclusive presmuption cannot be applied to such extreme and exceptioinal cases."
Citing from Murr v. Murr, 197 P. (2d) 369, where we
have as in this case a child born only slightly over six
months 'after the marriage was consummated, the appellate court reversed the trial court which applied the
conclusive presumption. The appellate court held that
under the circumstances, the presumption was rebuttable:
" 'A mature child having been born after an
alleged gestation period of six months and ten
days, which period according to authoritative
medical opinion ''""as about one month shorter than
the shortest (known) period of gestation for such
a birth, and the birth certificate being prima facie
evidence that it was a nine-months 'pregnancy~
was only rebuttable.''
In Dazey vs. Dazey et al., 122 P(:?d) 308, the California court again holds that where there is an extre1nely
long period of gt>station, that is longer than usual or
normal, the presumption is not applicable. Citing the
eas<' of l\1 <' Nmn~u'~a, supra. and ~--\.nderson vs. AEderson.
5 P(2d) SSl, tlw court agnin holds that w-hen a short
period of gPstation is not within the usual or normal
p('riod of gPstation the presmuption does not apply. In
th<' instant rase. besides the tstin1ony of the attending
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physician, Dr. Holbrook, that on the first visit he estimated the pregnancy was in its fourth month from the
physical findings, which differed from the menstrual
history given by defendant, and in applying the formula
given by defendant's witness, Dr. Horne, to the defendant of the defendant's admitted n1enstrual period on
November 6th, we arrive at the exact date the baby was
born. Dr. Holbrook estimated the time of birth as the middle of August, and his estimate was within two days of
the actual time of birth. When those facts are considered
with statements of the defendant to the plaintiff's parents, and with her admission to ~irs. Holder after the
baby was born that she had contacted a doctor relative
to a missed menstrual cycle prior to leaving for California in the latter part of December, combined with her
statements that she thought she was pregnant on December 25th, it would appear that defendant knew she was
pregnant and was concealing the fact to set up a marriage
with plaintiff, coerced by her statements that she was
bearing his child. When we consider further that she
failed to tell the plaintiff of Dr. Holbrook's estimated
time of arrival of the child in August, and her insistence
on taking a Freeman or rabbit test immediately upon
return from California, the evidence becomes even more
conclusive. We must also consider Dr. Holbrook's testimony that it was possible but highly improbable that a
JTreeman test would give a positive result within that
short a period after possible conception. The defendant
also admitted on the stand that she had been nauseated
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on the way to Oalifornia before any act of intercourse
with the plaintiff.
Considering the testimony as a whole and this court's
duty to give weight to the opportunity of the trial judge
to observe the witnesses firsthand, it would appear that
the evidence is overwhelming that the defendant was
pregnant prior to the December 24th act of intercourse
with the plaintiff, that she concealed that pregnancy,
represented to him that she was carrying his child, prevailed upon his parents thereon and fraudulently induced
a marriage which would not have taken plaee otherwise.
POINT IV
THE ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

In view of the findings and the weight of the evidence, the court did not err in denying defendant a ne\Y
trial. All that was brought forth at the ti1ne of ne\Y trial
was an affidavit signed by Juel E. Trowbridge, whose
testimony could have been proper rebuttal to the plaintiff's case had he been produced and been allmYed to lw
cross exan1ined.
The court did mnend several of the findings, correcting the date of initial intereourse frmn Deeen1ber 2~.
1956, to Dece1nher 24, 1956. Such an1endment to conform
to the evidence waR entirely proper.
SlJ~L\!AHY

It ·appearing from the ease of Bem~nt Y~. Bement.
110 Utah -1-51, 17-+ P(2d) 996, that n1isrepresentation by a
\\'nuum to indnr.<J a marriag·e, stating that she was preg-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
nant by the person induced when as 'a Inatter of fact she
vvas pregnant by some other person, is a ground for annulment for fraudulent misrepresentation, which the burden being on the plaintiff to sustain his burden of evidence, and proof in the instant case being conclusive that
the ehild born August 13, 1957, was not the child of the
plaintiff Richard Holder, and there being ample evidence
to support the trial court's finding that the child was not
fathered hy the plajntiff, ;ve contend that this court
should affinn the lower court's decree granting an annulment.
Respectfully subinitted,
RAYS. :McCARTY and
SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorneys for Respondent and
PlaiJntiff
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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